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Abstract 
This paper examines the roles of financial flexibility in firms’ security issuance decisions. 
Focusing on Asian Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) that are subject to regulatory debt 
limit, we construct a direct proxy to financial flexibility measured as the difference between debt 
limit and actual debt ratio. This unused debt capacity or buffer measures financial flexibility as it 
indicates how much additional debt a REIT can issue. REITs maintain significant debt buffer in 
their balance sheet which equals to 25% of the total assets. This buffer has been relatively stable 
during the 10 years study period indicating a conservative debt policy being adopted by REITs in 
our sample. Controlling for investment policy, we find that REITs’ security issuance decisions 
are influenced by its debt buffer in a manner consistent with financial flexibilities hypotheses 
where REITs with larger (smaller) unused debt capacity are more likely to issue marginal debt 
(equity) in the next period. The drop in debt buffer due to marginal debt issuance is swiftly 
replenished in the following six months period after the issuance. 
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Financial flexibility has become a popular topic in the finance literature since the publication of 
Graham and Harvey (2001)’s influential survey paper on the practice of corporate finance by top 
executives in the U.S. The respondents who comprising 329 chief finance officers gave a 
resounding approval to the important roles of financial flexibility in firm capital structure 
decisions outranks other traditional considerations such as tax benefits, default costs, and 
information asymmetric.
2
 A firm is considered to be financially flexible if it has sufficient 
financial slack to withstand liquidity or production shock, easy access to external capital market 
and is able to move quickly to take up the investment opportunity when it arises. Financial 
flexibility is therefore analogous to a financial option that allow firm to react to future 
contingency or unexpected outcome without much distortions (Byoun, 2011). In fact, the 
literature has established the value of financial flexibility in term of reducing investment 
distortions (Marchira and Mura, 2010; Jong, Verbeek and Verwijmeran, 2012), increases firm 
value (Gamba and Triantis, 2006) and lead to a better performance during the crisis periods 
(Arslan, Florackis and Ozlan, 2014)  
Despite being recognized as one of the most important determinants of capital structure 
choices, empirical evidence on the relevance of financial flexibility in firm capital structure is 
relatively scarce. This is because financial flexibility is not directly observable. Recent studies 
have attempted to overcome this issue by estimating the debt capacity from a debt rating 
regression (see De Jong, Verbeek, and Verwijmeren, 2012).  This estimated debt capacity is the 
cut-off debt ratio above which will substantially increase firm’s cost of debt due to increase level 
of financial distress. The difference between the estimated debt capacity and the actual debt 
known as debt buffer is used as proxy to financial flexibility. Others resort to indirect approach 
to measure financial flexibility such as cash holdings (Faulkender and Wang, 2006), leverage 
ratio (Byoun, 2011) and accessibility to public debts market (Lemmon and Zender, 2010). Allen 
(2000) adopts a qualitative approach through field interviews where the responding firms were 
asked about their debt buffer policy (Allen, 2000). 
3
 Graham (2000) on the other hand uses the 
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kink in the tax benefit function to infer how aggressive firms use debt. Specifically, firms with 
large untapped tax deductible benefits are considered to be conservative in their debt policy. 
In this paper, we propose a direct approach to measure firm’s financial flexibility by 
examining REITs in Asia where debt capacity (limit) is determined exogenously by the 
regulators. REITs in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia are subject to regulatory debt limit of 
60% (35% prior to Nov 2005), 45% and 50% (35% prior to August 2006) of total asset value 
respectively. Following previous literature, we measure financial flexibility as the company’s 
unused debt capacity or debt buffer, which corresponds to the difference between its regulatory 
debt limit and its debt ratio. This debt limit is binding since failing to adhere to this regulatory 
gearing will make REITs lose their tax-exempt status.
4
 None of the REITs in our sample breach 
their debt limit during the 10 years study period. In fact, REITs on average maintain a significant 
amount of debt buffer which equal to 25% of their total assets. Moreover, this buffer has been 
relatively stable even during the period of global financial crisis in 2008-9. 
The rest of the paper is proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature and 
describes the institutional background of REITs in Asia. Section 3 develops hypotheses for our 
empirical study. In section 4, we discuss the data and methodology used in this paper. Section 5 
presents empirical results and Section 6 provides conclusions. 
 
 
2. Institutional Background & Literature review 
 
2.1 REITs Institutional background 
REITs were first introduced in the U.S. in 1960s as a passive investment vehicle that invests in 
the real properties.  Asian countries only began to embrace the REIT structure in early 2000 with 
the first two REITs listed in Japanese markets followed by South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, 
Taiwan, Malaysia and Hong Kong. As of the end of Dec 2012, there were 145 listed REITs in 
Asia constitute of US$134.5 billion in market capitalization.  Figure 1 tracks the dramatic growth 
of the REIT market in Asia between 2001 and 2012.  
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Numerous authors have argued that REITs provide a unique laboratory to test the capital 
structure theories because the key drivers behind the traditional capital structure theories may not 
be relevant to REITs (Ooi, et al. 2010; Harrison et al. 2011).
5
 To begin with, REITs do not pay 
tax as long as they distributed 90% of their taxable income as dividend. This tax exempt status of 
REITs essentially muted tax-shield motivation from using debt. According to trade-off theory, 
REITs should carry zero debt in their balance sheet. The distribution requirement also makes 
REITs become cash constraints entities that have to repeatedly return to the capital market for 
funding. The capital market may therefore less sensitive to the adverse selection issues 
surrounding the equity issuance of REITs than general firms. Moreover, REITs do not enjoy the 
full financing options as enjoyed by general firms. This renders pecking order’s hierarchy of 
financing choices irrelevant.  
 
 
2.2 Literature review 
Ever since Graham and Harvey (2001), a central question being posed in corporate finance 
literature is the roles of financial flexibility in firms’ capital structure decisions. Graham and 
Harvey (2001)’s survey shows that although preserving of financial flexibility come to 
consideration when issue debt, it is not related to factors related to pecking order such as 
informational asymmetric (size and dividend payout) and growth options. The authors find that 
financial flexibility is statistically more important for informational insensitive firms (dividend-
paying firms) which run contrary to Myers and Majluf (1984)’s pecking order model’s prediction. 
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Pecking order model posits that firms with lesser information problems have little incentive to 
maintain financial slack to avoid issuing of information sensitive securities.  
Findings from this survey paper cannot be easily verified by empirical tests since debt 
capacity is unobservable in actual data. Lemmon and Zender (2010) argue that debt capacity is 
the critical missing link that could possible explain some of the puzzles in capital structure 
theory. One of these puzzles is that firms on average have less leverage then one would expect 
based on the traditional trade-off theory. Graham (2000) for instance reports that 44% of U.S. 
firms are underleveraged. Paradoxically, he finds that firms that use debt conservatively are large, 
profitable, liquid, in stable industries, and face low ex ante costs of distress large. Graham offers 
financial flexibility as one of the candidates explaining this anomaly. Empirically, he shows that 
firms appear to retain significant amount of unused flexibility even after expanding. 
Lemmon and Zender (2010) contend that the absence of debt capacity has exposed the 
existing literature to misclassification of firms with large debt capacity but high leverage as 
unconstrained firms and those with small capacity but low leverage as constrained firms. This 
point is illustrates in Table 1 where Firm A with debt capacity doubles that of Firm B is in fact 
financially more constrained (0% debt buffer) as compared to Firm B (30% debt buffer) due to 
its high debt ratio. Existing capital structure theory generally silence on the heterogeneity of 




De Jong, Verbeek and Verwijmeran (2011) extend the literature by quantifying firms’ 
debt capacity. In particular, they construct a model explaining a firm’s credit rating and use this 
to derive an estimate of the marginal debt ratio that would make a firm lose its investment grade 
rating and hence substantially increase its cost of debt. They interpret this debt ratio as an 
estimate for a firm’s debt capacity. In a similar vein, Leary and Roberts (2010) and Lemmon and 
Zender (2010) measure firms’ debt capacity based firms’ predicted bond rating, i.e. firms in the 
lowest (highest) 3
rd
 of the distribution of predicted bond rating are classified as firm with low 
debt capacity (high debt capacity). One drawback from these methods is sample selection bias 
where the estimated debt capacity is generated from sample of firms with credit rating. It is 
plausible for some firms to deliberately avoid credit rating for reason beyond financial flexibility. 
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Using De Jong, Verbeek and Verwijmeran (2011)’s approach to estimate debt capacity, 
Hess and Immenkotter (2012) show that firms target on preserving financial flexibility provided 
by debt buffer or unused debt capacity. Specifically, they show that firms close to or beyond 
their debt capacity are more likely to reduce their leverage in the following period by issuing 
equity or repurchasing debts. Moreover, debt issues are most common for firms with large debt 
buffer. The direct link between firms’ funding decision and its debt buffer is further echoed by 
De Jong, Verbeek and Verwijmeren (2012). Though not the focus of their paper, these authors 
show that unused debt capacity significantly increases firms’ likelihood to issue marginal debts. 
We attempt to circumvent the unobservability of debt capacity by focusing on REITs in 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia that operate under a regulatory debt limit or debt capacity 
regime. Capitalizing on the exogenously determined debt capacity, we construct a direct measure 
of firm’s unused debt capacity measured as the difference between REIT’s regulatory debt limit 
and the actual debt ratio. This buffer measures financial flexibility as it indicates how much 
additional debt a firm can issue before it exceeds its debt limit.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
The main objective of this paper is to show that debt buffer has predictive power for REITs’ 
future financing decisions even after controlling for factors that are commonly associated with 
future financing decisions. REITs provide a good laboratory tests to the role of financial 
flexibility due to its financially constraints status.  External capital is the life blood for REITs 
with marginal financing issuance made up of 50.2% of the total observations (to elaborate more 
in Section 4 of the paper). It is sensible for REIT managers to time their capital raising activities 
based on their current debt buffer. This is evidenced by CapitaMall Trust (CMT), a Singapore 
REIT, which details in its 2012 annual report how an equity issue (private placement) has 
improved its debt buffer (headroom) as follows: 
 
The private placement in November 2012 improved CMT’s financial capacity and flexibility, with 
gross proceeds of approximately S$250.0 million raised from the issue of 125.0 million new units. 
The net proceeds, together with part of the amounts raised from fixed rate notes issuances, will 
be used to refinance CMT’s debts due in 2013. This will reduce CMT’s aggregate leverage and 




We hypothesize that controlling for investment policy, debt and equity issuances are 
motivated by REITs’ intention to preserve financial flexibility. This hypothesis is built on 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Whited (2011) (DDW hereafter)’s theoretical model where the cost of 
leverage not only depend on firms’ current capital structure, but also include the opportunity cost 
of its consequent future inability to borrow. DDW’s model suggests that firms increase leverage 
when facing investment shocks and subsequently reduce leverage in order to reposition 
themselves for other future investment shocks. Byoun (2011) further argues that DDW’s model 
essentially describes the utilizing and recharging of financial flexibility by firms. In this paper, 
we provide empirical evidence of how firms preserve, draw down and replenish its financial 
flexibility over time. Specifically, we develop the following hypotheses for our empirical 
exercise. 
 
Hypothesis I (Financial Capacity Hypothesis): There is a positive (negative) relation 
between marginal debt (equity) issues in period t and REIT’s debt buffer in period t-1 
 
Hypothesis I is based on the premise that controlling for investment needs in period t, only 
REITs with sufficient large debt buffer in the preceding period exhibit a higher probability of 
issuing marginal debt in the following period. REITs with low buffer on the other hand will opt 
for equity issues to avoid exceed their regulatory debt limit.  
 
Hypothesis II (Financing Drawdown Hypothesis): There is a negative (positive) relation 
between marginal debt (equity) issues in period t and REIT’s debt buffer in period t 
 
Hypothesis II is a straightforward one where marginal debt (equity) issuance in period t, all else 
equal, will lead to a smaller (larger) debt buffer in the same period controlling for investment 
needs in period t. 
   
Hypothesis III (Financial Replenish Hypothesis): There is no significant relation between 




Hypothesis III is based on the premise that controlling for investment needs in period t, REITs 
will swiftly replenish (utilize) their debt buffer after a marginal debt (equity) issuance. We 
therefore expect no significant relation between marginal debt (equity) issuance in the current 
period (t) with next period debt buffer (t+1) for the debt buffer has return to its pre-issue level.  
 
4. Methodology and Data 
We employ a multinomial logistic (MNL) model to examine the financing choices of REITs 
where the dependent variables are represented by four mutually exclusive financing options: (1) 
debt issuances; (2) equity issuances, (3) dual issuances, and (4) no material financing activities as 
the base option. Our empirical model is designed as in Harrison et al. (2011) with lagged (Debt 
Buffer t-1), contemporaneous (Debt Buffer t) and lead (Debt Buffer t+1) debt buffers as our key 
variables of interest. Equation (1) is used to examine factors that affect a firm’s choice of 
security issuance. See Table 2 for the definitions for the explanatory variables. 
 
Financing Choices i t = β0 + β1(Debt Buffer) i t-1+ β2(Debt Buffer) i t + β3(Debt Buffer) i t+1 
β4(Asset Tangibility) i t+ β5(Asset Growth) + β6(Market-to-Book) i t + β7(Firm Size) i t+ 
β8(Firm Age) i t + β9(Profitability) i t + β10(Stock Performance) i t + β11(Interest Rate) t + 
β12(Credit Crisis) t +βj(Country Dummies) j,t  + βk(Year Dummies) k,,t + βl(Property 




Follow Harrison et al. (2011), we control for the following traditional capital structure 
determinants. To the extent that real estate provide more effective collateral for lenders in the 
case of borrower financial distress, according to trade-off theory, increased use of tangible or 
long-run fixed assets (Asset Tangibility) should be associated with increased debt capacity for 
firm, thus, increased in firm leverage. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) find support for this hypothesis. We control for real estate investment growth (Asset 
Growth) since REITs rely heavily on external financing to finance property acquisitions. We 
expect this variable to be positively related to marginal security issuances. Several studies 
documented a negative relationship between a firm’s use of financial leverage and Market-to-
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Book ratio due to market timing reasons (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) or the avoidance debt 
overhang problem by high growth firms as predicted by pecking order theory (Myers, 1977).
6
  
The literature suggests Firm size to exert both positive and negative effects on firm’s 
leverage decisions. The former is consistent with the prediction of trade-off theory where 
increased in size should decreased the bankruptcy costs faced by firms, hence, larger firms, all 
else equal, should borrow more. The latter is in line pecking order’s prediction where larger 
firms face lower information costs when issue equity.  According to perking order theory, Firm 
Age should be associated with a lower use of financial leverage as younger firms are typically 
more informationally challenged. Both trade-off and perking order theories predict a positive 
relationship between Profitability and leverage. Under the trade-off theory, profitable firms are 
leveraging up due to the decline in probability of encountering financial distress. Pecking order 
theory suggests profitable firms will more incline to increase their use if leverage to avoid the 
negative signal associated with equity issuance. 
We also include two market timing variables in the regression.
7
 First, firms experiencing 
significant stock price appreciation (Stock Performance) should be characterized by lower 
leverage, as these firms would be relatively more likely to issue equity than their low 
appreciation peers. Second, when market interest rates are high, firms should be reluctant to 
issue long-term fixed-income securities (Interest Rate). Lastly, we control for time (Year, Credit 
Crisis), Country and Property fixed effects.  
  
 
4.1 Data and Sample 
The primary data used in this research is an unbalanced panel data of REITs from Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Malaysia from Bloomberg’s database. After dropping firms with missing 
variables, the final sample comprises 431 firm-semiannual observations from a total of 47 unique 
REITs over the period 2003-2012. The semiannual data used in this research would better 
capture the dynamics debt buffer in firms’ balance sheet and offer more insights into firms’ 
corporate financing decisions. The following filters were applied so that only material financing 
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events are included in the sample of financing activities: the sum involved must, firstly, be larger 
than US$5 million and constitute more than 5% of the REIT’s total assets.  
Table 3 shows that between 2003 and 2012, 242 material financing events took place, 
which represents 50.2% of the firm-semiannuals. This is higher than 41.3% registered by REITs 
in the U.S. (Ooi et al, 2010). The high frequency of capital raising activities is due to REIT’s 
cash constraints status that makes them repeatedly return to capital market for funding. Equity 
issues are the predominant form of financing with 122 events outpaced debt issues of 52 events.
8
 
This runs opposite to REITs in the U.S. where debt financing was found to outpace equity 




4.2 Debt Buffer Over time 
 
Figure 2 presents the average debt buffer for REITs during June 2003 to December 2012. There 
was a spike in debt buffer from 4% of total assets in June 2005 to 28% in December 2005. The 
sudden surge in debt buffer was due to a change in regulatory debt limit in Singapore and 
Malaysia to 60% (from 35% prior to November 2005) and 50% (from 35% prior to August 2006) 
respectively.
9
 REIT managers in Singapore and Malaysia clearly did not tap into the excess debt 
capacity following the revision in debt limit. Debt buffer has been relatively stable between 2006 
and 2012.
10
  Nevertheless, we do observe a small drop in debt buffer during the global financing 
crisis from 27% in December 2007 (pre-crisis) to 23% in December 2008 (crisis) before 
reverting back to the pre-crisis level of 37% in December 2009 (post-crisis). This pattern is 
consistent DDW (2011)’s financial flexibility theory which postulates that managers strive to 
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 In an unreported test, we also track the time path of debt buffer for individual REITs since their IPO year to 
analyze the dynamics of debt buffer adjustment. Consistent with the aggregate find findings in Figure 1 above, 
REITs’ debt buffer is relatively stable up during the first 10 years of IPO in the range of 22%-29% of total assets.  
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for each of the variables in our model are found in Table 4. Debt Buffer is 
distributed symmetrically across the sample of REITs with the sample mean and median equal to 
25.0% of total assets. These numbers is higher than 16.2% and 17.2% reported by Jong, Verbeek 
and Verwijmeren (2012) and Hess and Immenkotter (2012) respectively estimated from debt 
rating regression models. Approximately 93% of REITs’ total assets are tangible fixed assets 
which consistent with their business nature of owning productive real estate. REITs in our 
sample are expanding aggressively at 18.8% p.a. (9.4%x2) by acquiring properties within a short 
time period.  
The average market-to-book ratio, a proxy to growth opportunities is approximately 0.92 
times with a range of 0.49 to 2.27. Firms in the sample have an average size of US$1.6 billion, 
with the Hong Kong based Link REIT being the largest REIT possessing nearly U$11.28 billion 
in assets for fiscal year 2012. REITs in our sample are relatively young with an average age of 
3.76 years as the sector only began to flourish in early 2000s. Profitability wise, a typical REIT 
averaged a 3.0% as measured by the ratio EBITDA to total assets. Average stock performance of 
2.0% represents the price appreciation of individual REIT stocks over the last three months. 
Turning to the macro variables, the 10-years bond yield averaged 2.9% while credit crisis period 
constitutes of 22% of the total observations.     
 
     {Table 4} 
 
5. MNL Regression Results 
The estimation results of the full MNL model are presented in Table 5. Note that the reported 
coefficient estimates compare the likelihood of (1) issuing debt, (2) issuing equity and issuing 
both debt and equity (3), relative to the likelihood of not executing any material financing (4) 
activities in that period. All models control for country, year and REIT property focus effects. 
Not reported here, the average variance-inflating factors (VIF) of 3.42 suggest that the 
explanatory variables are not highly collinear.  
There is strong evidence supporting our financial flexibility story. Controlling for REITs’ 
investment policy (Asset Growth), financial flexibility in the preceding period (Debt Buffer t-1) is 
positive (negative) and strongly related to marginal debt (equity) issues in the current period. 
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This is consistent with the financial capacity hypothesis where REITs try not to exceed their debt 
capacity by only issue marginal debts when they have sufficient debt buffer to do so. Equity 
issues become a preferred choice when debt buffer in the preceding period is low.  
Financing drawdown hypothesis is supported where debt buffer in the current period 
(Debt Buffer t) is negative (positive) and significantly related to marginal debt (equity) issued 
during the same period. Turning to the lead debt buffer, the coefficient for Debt buffer t+1 is 
insignificant in debt issues equation implying that that the debt issuers’ debt buffer is of no 
different from their non-issuer counterparts 6 months after the issuance. This is in line with our 
Financing Replenish hypothesis where REITs swiftly replenish their debt buffer after a marginal 
debt issue to prepare themselves for future investment or earning shocks.  
The coefficient for Debt buffer t+1 however remains positive and significant in equity 
issues equation implying that compared to debt issues, marginal equity issues have a longer 
impact on REITs’ capital structure. In an unreported test, we find that the coefficient for debt 
buffer in equity equation only turns insignificant at period t+3 (1.5 years after issuance). This 
suggests that besides cater for investment needs, marginal equity issues do allow REITs to 
reconfigure their capital structure. In the context of this paper, increases REITs’ debt buffer or 
financial flexibility which is consistent with an anecdote we highlight earlier. The results for dual 
issuers resemble those of debt issuers where REITs preserve significant debt buffer in their 
balance sheet prior to marginal debt issues (a positive Debt Buffer t-1), this debt buffer is 
depleting during the issuance period (a negative Debt Buffer t) and is replenished in the next 6 
months after the issuance (an insignificant Debt Buffer t+1).  
Turning to the control variables, except for Asset Growth and Firm Size, none of the firm 
characteristics are found to be related to REITs’ security issuance decisions. This result 
reinforces the argument that the traditional capital structure determinants may not be relevant to 
REITs due to its unique institutional structure. The coefficient for Asset Growth is significantly 
positive in all the regressions, suggesting that REITs rely heavily on external financing to 
support their growth due to their cash constraints status. This is in line with REIT in the U.S. 
where only 7% of investments are funded by retained earnings (Ott, Riddigiouh and Yi, 2005). 
The coefficient for Firm Size is significantly positive in equity and dual issues equation 
suggesting that smaller-size REITs are less active in the capital market. The positive findings in 
equity equation is also consistent with the pecking order theory’s prediction where large firms 
13 
 
tend to opt for equity issues as they face lower information costs compared to small firms. As 
expected, the global financial crisis in 2008-9 has dampened REIT sector’s capital raising 
activities. This was the period where capital and loan markets dried-up while firms cutting back 
their capital expenditure. The coefficient for Credit Crisis is negative and significantly (except 





5.1 Robustness tests 
To examine the robustness of our results, we also estimate the regression models using the 
logistics regression with a binary variable equal to one for marginal debt (equity) issues as the 
dependent variable. Our key results remain unchanged with the logistics methodology. To further 
differentiate our financial flexibility story from firms’ target leverage behavior as prescribed by 
the trade-off theory, we include a variable that capture the difference between the predicted 
target leverage and the actual leverage ratio into the regression models.
11
 The target leverage 
ratio is obtained using regression-proxy adopted by Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Flannery and 
Rangan.
12
 Inclusion of this target leverage variable does not alter the conclusion of this study. 
None of the target leverage coefficients is found to be significantly related to REITs’ marginal 
financing decisions. We also add cash holdings and dividend payout in the regression models. 





We document, for the first time, firms’ actual debt buffer by focusing on REITs in Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Malaysia that are subject to regulatory debt limit (debt capacity). Debt buffer is 
measured as the difference between debt limit and actual debt ratio. The substantial debt buffer 
(25% of total assets) maintain by REITs in our sample is consistent with the stylized fact of firms 
tend to operate below their optimal debt ratio (Graham, 2000). Controlling for firms’ investment 
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policy, we provide strong evidence showing how REITs in our sample preserve, draw down and 
replenish their flexibility over time in a manner consistent with the predictions of financial 
flexibility hypotheses. Specifically, debt buffer in the preceding period is positively (negative) 
associated with the marginal debt (equity) in the current period. This relationship flips to 
negative (positive) when REITs utilize (stockpile) their debt buffer during the debt (equity) 
issuance period. Post issuance, REIT managers react swiftly to replenish their debt buffer 6 
months after a marginal debt issues. Marginal equity issues on the other hand have a longer 
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Figure 1: Growth of REITs listed in Asia 
This figure tracks the total number of listed REITs in Asia from 2001 to 2012 (bar chart using left axis) as 
well as the total market capitalization of Asian REITs during the corresponding periods (line chart using 





























































































































Figure 2: Asian REITs’ debt buffer during June 2003 to December 2012 
 
This figure tracks the total market capitalization of REITs in Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia from 
June 2003 to December 2012 (bar chart using left axis) as well as the debt buffer during the 




Table 1: A hypothetical case showing the role debt capacity 
 
 Actual debt ratio Debt capacity 
(unobservable) 
Unused debt capacity 
(debt buffer) 
Firm A 80% 80% 0% 


















































































































Table 2: Explanatory variables in the regression models 
Variable Definition 
Debt Buffer The difference between regulatory debt limit and 
actual debt ratio. 
Asset Tangibility  Ratio of net property investments to total assets. 
Asset Growth Real estate investment growth for the past six 
months. 
Market-to-Book ratio Market value of equity plus total book assets minus 
book value of common equity divided by total book 
assets. 
Firm Size (in USD Million) Book value of total assets 
Firm Age (year) Number of years since the REIT’s initial public 
offering. 
Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to total assets. 
Stock Performance Price appreciation of individual REIT stocks over the 
last three months. 
10-year Bond Yield Average 10-year government bond yield estimated 
from monthly observations over the 12-month period 
Credit Crisis (0,1) Binary variable taking on value of one for 
observation during the period Dec 2007-Dec 2008, 
zero otherwise. 
 
Table 3 Financing activities of Asian REITs (2003-2012) 
Mutually exclusive financing 
activities 
Count Percent 
(0) No material change 244 50.2 
(1) Equity issues 122 25.1 
(2) Debt issues 52 10.7 
(3) Dual issues 68 14.0 












Table 4: Descriptive statistics  
This table shows the characteristics of the sample consisting of 431 semi-annual observations for 47 










Unused debt capacity 0.25 0.25 0.119 0 0.60 
Firm Characteristics      
Asset Tangibility  0.93 0.95 0.09 0.31 1.00 
Market-to-book  0.92 0.92 0.21 0.49 2.27 
Asset Growth 0.094 0.052 0.198 -0.633 1.793 
Firm Size (in USD Million) 1,612.32 902.52 1,863.74 52.19 11,280.06 
Firm Age (year) 3.76 3.56 2.10 0.340 10.47 
Profitability 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.08 
Stock Performance 0.02 0.02 0.16 -0.72 0.71 
Macro Variables      
10-year Bond Yield 2.91 2.83 0.84 0.97 4.34 
































Table 5: MNL model in joint-financing decisions  
 
The table presents the MNL estimation results on the probability of each financing event against 
alternative in a given quarter. The dependent variables are the three mutually exclusive financing choices, 
with the passive or no material financing activity being the base case. Our key variable of interest Debt 
Buffer defined as the difference between regulatory debt limit and actual debt ratio. Other explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 1. The sample covers the marginal financing activities of Asian REITs 
between 20031H and 20122H. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. T-statistics are in 






Explanatory variables Dependent variable:  [passive=0] 
 [1] Debt issues [2] Equity issues [3] Dual issues 
Intercept -4.169 -15.900 -3.363 
 (-0.38) (-3.04) (-0.31) 
Debt Buffer t-1  172.49*** -23.339*** 121.768*** 
 (4.84) (-3.18) (2.85) 
Debt Buffer t -190.38*** 16.462* -130.621*** 
 (-5.46) (1.80) (-3.45) 
Debt Buffer t+1 2.551 11.145** -11.908 
 (0.29) (2.38) (-1.48) 
Asset Tangibility t -5.337 2.927 -11.302 
 (-0.67) (0.97) (-1.33) 
Asset Growth t 59.705*** 55.667*** 78.078*** 
 (6.00) (6.16) (7.97) 
Market-to-book 1.428 -0.103 -2.497 
 (0.47) (-0.05) (-0.81) 
Firm Size t -1.340 2.233*** 2.778* 
 (-0.87) (2.56) (1.94) 
Firm Age t -1.181 1.524 -3.373 
 (-0.33) (0.62) (-1.10) 
Profitability t 19.006 22.989 -31.353 
 (0.34) (0.46) (-0.53) 
Stock Performance t -0.076 3.394 1.705 
 (-0.02) (1.17) (0.30) 
Interest rate t 2.281 -0.653 1.162 
 (1.04) (-0.93) (0.52) 
Credit Crisis (0,1) t -15.167*** -1.719* -1.740 
 (-5.91) (-1.70) (-0.70) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Property dummies Yes Yes Yes 
No of Obs                                              431 
Pseudo R
2
                                              0.74 
    
